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[L.A. No. 24116. In Bank. Mar. 12, 1957.] 
CI'l'Y OF' GJJENDAIJE, Appellant, v. CIIRIS'I'INE 
TIWNDSEN, R.espondent. 
[L. A. No. 24117. In Bank. Mar. 12, 1957.] 
CI'I'Y OF GLENDALE, Appellant, v. CHARLES JARMER, 
Respondent. 
A. No. 24118. In Bank. .M:nr.12, 1067.] 
CI'rY OF GLENDAI1J:!J, Appc;llant, Y. R E. TISDALE, 
Respondent. 
[1) Taxation-Delegation of Taxing Power-As Municipal Affair. 
-The levy and collection of taxes by a city having- a charter 
is a municipal affair; the power is broad, being limited only 
by the charter and the Constitution. 
[2] Municipal Corporations-Legislative Control-Municipal Af-
fairs.-A city which has accepted the privilege of autonomous 
rule under the Constitution has all powers over municipal 
affairs, otherwise lawfully exercised, subject only to clear 
and explicit limitations and restrictions contained in the 
charter. 
[3] Id.-Charter.-A city charter adopted under the home rule 
provisions of the Constitution operates not as a grant of 
power, but as an instrument of limitation and restriction on 
the exercise of power over all municipal affairs which the city 
is assumed to possess; and the enumeration of powers does 
not constitute an exclusion or limitation. 
[4] !d.-Legislative Control-Municipal Affairs.-In respect to 
municipal affairs, a city operating- under a home rule charter 
[1] Power of city under freeholder's charter over taxes, note, 
35 A.L.R. 883. See also Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 33; Am.Jur., Taxation, 
§ 147. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 95 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 23; [2, 4] Municipal Cor-
porations, §83(6); [3] Municipal Corporations, §75; [5] Munici-
pal Corporations, § 86; [6, OJ Municipal Corporations, § 78; [7] 
Taxation, § 21; [8] Taxation, § 27; [10, 11] Municipal Corpora-
tions, § 131; [12] Municipal Corporations, § 131; Taxation, § 21; 
[13-16] Taxation, § 457. 
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is not subject to general law except as the charter may 
provide. 
[5] !d.-Legislative Control-Municipal A:ffairs.-The levy of 
taxes for city purposes, and the collection, treatment and 
disposal of city sewage by a chartered city, are municipal 
affairs, and neither may be held to be circumscribed except 
as expressly limited by charter provisions. 
[6] Id.-Charter-Construction.-All rules of statutory construc-
tion as applied to charter provisions are subordinate to the 
controlling principle that a city, by accepting the privilege 
of autonomous rule, has full control over its municipal affairs 
except as clearly and explicitly curtailed by the charter; a 
restriction on the exercise of municipal power may not be 
implied. 
[7] Taxation-Delegation of Taxing Power-Local Governing 
Bodies.-A chartered city by virtue of its power as such has 
power to make a charge for rubbish collection unless it is 
expressly denied such power by the charter or Constitution; 
specific authority is not required. 
[8] !d.-Construction of City Charter.-A city charter provision 
that the council, whenever it determines that public interest 
requires an expenditure for a municipal purpose which cannot 
be provided out of ordinary city revenue, "may" submit to the 
voters a proposition providing for a "special tax" or the issu-
ing of bonds, when considered in connection with a related 
provision that the total tax rate for any one year "shall not 
exceed one per cent of the assessed valuation, unless a special 
tax be authorized," referred only to a property tax, and was 
not a limitation on the city's power to charge occupants of 
buildings for the collection of rubbish. 
[9] Municipal Corporations- Charter- Construction.- A city 
charter section providing nothing more than a permissivP 
method by which rubbish may be required to be removed is 
not a limitation on other methods. 
[10] !d.-Police Power-Rubbish.-A city has power to pass 
police regulations on the subject of rubbish. 
[11] !d.-Police Power-Rubbish.-An ordinance of a chartered 
city requiring occupants of buildings to pay charges for 
rubbish collection, regardless of whether or not they use the 
collection service, is valid, there being no restriction in the 
Constitution or the city's charter, the benefit being the avail-
ability of the collection service to all occupants. 
[12] !d.-Police Power-Rubbish: Taxation-Delegation of Taxing 
Power-Local Governing Powers.-A city rubbish ordinance 
which is both a police and a taxing measure may perform 
both functions, taxation and regulation, and it may be upheld 
as valid under either or both powers. 
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Taxation-Excise Taxes.-A charge for rubbish collection 
of property graduated according to the 
nature of buildings occupied, when considered as a tax, is 
more like an excise tax than any other kind; it is not a 
nvnn.P"'t" tax, 
!d.-Excise Taxes.-In its modern sense an excise tax is any 
tax which does not fall within the classification of a poll tax 
or a property tax, and embraces every form of burden not 
laid directly on persons or property. 
rt5] !d.-Excise Taxes.-A right may be subject to an excise tax 
even if the right of occupancy rather than of the accumulation 
and use of a collection service is involved, though it is a 
right which cannot be prohibited under the Constitution. 
[16] !d.-Excise Taxes.-A charge imposed by an ordinance of a 
chartered city for rubbish collection against "occupants" of 
property graduated according to the nature of buildings occu-
pied may be called an excise tax on such occupants for the 
privilege of accumulating rubbish and having available collec-
tion service therefor, and is not a tax on their interest in the 
property as an occupant or possessor; there is no unjust 
classification, and the tax is valid in the absence of any con-
stitutional or charter provision which would invalidate it. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Jerold E. vVei1, Judge. Reversed. 
Aetions to recover charges imposed by a city ordinance for 
rubbish collections. Judgments of dismissal entered after 
general demurrers to complaint were sustained with leave to 
amend aud failure of plaintiff to amend, reversed. 
Henry 1\fcClernan, City Attorney, John H. Lauten, Assist-
ant City Attorney, and Joseph W. Rainville, Deputy City 
Attorney, for Appellant. 
H.oger Arnebergh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Bourke 
,fones aucl James A. Doherty, Assistant City Attorneys, and 
Moses A. Berman, Deputy City Attorney, as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Appellant. 
Jack B. Tenney and Cecil W. Collins for Respondents. 
CAR'rER, J.-Plaintiff, a chartered city, enacted an orcli-
nauee pertaining to rubbish. It provides that rubbish includes 
[14] See Am.Jur., Taxation, § 33. 
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combustible and noncombustible material.* Every person 
having ''charge or control'' of any place where any rubbish 
accumulates shall cause it to be placed in specified receptacles 
and shall not permit it to accumulate for over certain periods 
of time (combustible - one week ; noncombustible - one 
month). The city shall provide for its collection at certain 
intervals. No person who pays the "minimum charge for 
collection'' shall set out for collection more than a specified 
quantity; if additional quantities are to be collected, extra 
charge shall be made. By section 8 the city council ''. . . 
finds that the periodic collection of rubbish from all places 
in the City benefits all occupants of places and premises in 
the City ... and therefore all such occupants are made liable 
for the rubbish collection fees prescribed by this ordinance." 
(Ordinance 1764, § 8.) There are then set forth a schedule 
of "fees" varying according to the nature of the use of 
the premises occupied, such as 75 cents per month for "single 
family dwellings,'' and a different amount for apartments or 
places of business. The fees are added to the electric light 
bills of the occupant. Extra charges are made for rubbish 
in excess of the amounts specified. ''A fee imposed by .. . 
[the] ordinance shall be a civil debt owing to the City .. . 
from the occupant of the property receiving the service.'' 
( § 9 (e).) Compliance with the ordinance necessary to pro-
cure the collection and removal thereof shall be a defense 
to any prosecution for failure to remove or dispose of rubbish. 
A violation of the ordinance shall be a misdemeanor punish-
able as specified. 
The plaintiff city commenced three actions which were con-
sidered together on demurrer against each of three persons 
for the several months that they had not paid the charge 
*Rubbish includes " ... paper, leaves, Christmas trees, chips, grass, 
pasteboard, carpets, clothing, magazines, books, straw, packing material, 
barrels, boxes, crates, cartons, rags, furniture and all other similar 
articles or materials which will burn by contact with flames of ordinary 
temperature which are rejected by the owner or producer thereof as 
worthless, or useless, but shall not include 'garbage' as that term is 
defined in the ordinance of the City providing for collection thereof, 
or materials or quantities thereof determined by the City Manager to be 
too large or too hazardous to burn in the City's incinerator .... 'Non-
combustible Rubbish' shall include ashes, broken glass and crockery 
bottles, tin cans and containers, metals, all other similar articles or 
materials and not to exceed three (3) cubic feet of non-combustible 
building materials which are rejected by the owner or producer thereof 
as wo:·thless or useless, and for the purposes of this ordinance shall 
include those materials or quantities thereof cletermined by the City 
Manager to be too large or too hazardous to burn in the City's incin-
erator." (Ordinance 1764, § 1.) 
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le\'ied by the ordinance. Jt is that the person named 
as defendant a residenee in ihe city; 
(luring his term of oeeupaney rlcfemlnnt " the use 
and ocenpaney of the said and the privilege of the 
use, acemnnlation, and of eombustible and noneom-
hustiblc rubbish and refuse thereon"; that plaintiff's agents 
!lave called regularly at the homes of defendant to collect 
1·n bbish "to the general benefit of the community at large 
in the prevention of nnhea1thfnl conditions, the lessening of 
fire hazard and the diminution of tho presence of air pollu-
taats (smog) in said City." Tho charges nmde under the 
ordimuwe have not been paid. There is no allegation that 
defem1ants had any rubbish to be colleded or that any was 
('olleeted from them. Defendants' general demurrers for 
failnre to make such alleg·ations ~were sustained with lrave 
to amend but plaintiff failed to amend and judgments of 
dismissal of the actions ~~-ere entered. Plaintiff appeals. 
Plaintiff (:ontends that the rubbish ordinance is both a 
police and taxing measure and valid in both respeets; that 
the tax portion does not violate the eity eharter. Defendants 
assert that the eharge made against oeenpants is not a valid 
tax nor special assessment, property, excise or license tax, 
nor is it a proper charge for policr' regulation; that it is for 
the serviee of having rubbish removed and tl1ero is no allega-
tion here that any rubbish was removed from their property 
by plaintiff. If it is a tax of any kind it is on the oceupancy 
of property and beyond the power of the city to levy under 
its charter. 
No contention is made by plaintiff that it is a property 
tax and hence possibly subject to the provisions of the Con-
stitution on property taxation.* Nor is there any contention 
tllat it is a special assessmelli levied on property aecording 
to the benefits receiVl'd from the ll~(' of the money thereby 
mise(1, or Ji<:onse tas: for revrnne or regulation. It is not 
elaimed that the charge is for serviees performed, that is, 
the eolledion of rubbisl1, inasnnwh as there is no allegation in 
the <·~omplaint that any rubbish was eollreted from defendants 
and tlw eharge fixed b,\T section 8 of the or(linanee, supra, 
applies generally to all oeenpants whether or not rubbish is 
('Ollreted, although it is allrged that t1Je service was available 
to (lefendants who enjoye(l the privilege of using the premises 
*All property in the state shall he taxed in proportion to its value. 
(Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 1.) 
48 C.2d--4 
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for the accumulation of rubbish and plaintiff's agent has 
regularly called for rubbish at the premises occupied by 
defendants. 
[1] The levy and collection of taxes by a city having a 
charter under our Constitution is a municipal affair. The 
power is broad, being limited only by the charter and the 
Constitution. (Fox etc. Corp. v. City of Bakersfield, 36 Cal. 
2d 136 [222 P.2d 879].) It is said in Ainswor·th v. Bryant, 
34 Cal.2d 465, 469 [211 P.2d 564] : "It i~ well settled that 
the power of a municipal corporation operating under a free-
holders' charter . . . to impose taxes 'for revenue purposes, 
including license taxes, is strictly a municipal affair' pur-
~uant to the direct constitutional grant of the people of the 
state (Const., art. XI, § 6; West Coast Advedising Co. v. San 
Francisco, 14 Cal.2d 516, 524 [95 P.2d 138] ), and that 'the 
restrictions on the exercise of that power ar·e only the limita-
tions and rcstr·ictions appearing in the Constit1dion and in 
the charter itself.' (Ibid, p. 526.) So it was said in the 
earlier case of Ex parte Brann, 141 Cal. 204, at pages 209-
210 [74 P. 780], quoting from lVIr. Justice ] 1 ield in United 
States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381 [25 L.Ed. 225] : 'A 
municipality without the power of taxation would be a body 
without life, incapable of acting, and serving no useful pur-
poses .... "\Vhen such a corporation is created, the power of 
taxation is vested in it, as an essential attribute, for all 
the purposes of its existence, unless its exercise be in express 
terms prohibited. For the accomplishment of these purposes, 
its authorities, however limited the corporation, must have 
power to raise money and control its expenditure.' '' (Em-
phasis added.) [2] And further: " ... that by accepting 
the privilege of autonomous rule the city has all powers over 
municipal affairs, otherwise lawfully exercised, subject only 
to the clear and explicit limitations and restrictions contained 
in the charter. [3] The charteJ· operates not as a grant of 
power·, but as an instrnment of limitation and restriction on 
the exercise of powM· over all rnnnicipal affairs which the city 
is assumed to possess; and the enumeration of powers does not 
constitute an exclusion or limitation. (West Coast Advertis-
ing Co. v. San Francisco, 14 Cal.2d 516, 521-522, 525 [95 P.2d 
138] alld cases cited; City of Oakland v. Williams, 15 Cal.2d 
542, 550 [103 P.2d 168]; San Francisco v. Boyd, 17 Cal. 
2d 606, 617-618 [110 P.2d 1036]; Kennedy v. Ross, 28 Cal.2d 
569, 575 [170 P .2d 904] ; Ayres v. City Council of Los An-
geles, ante, pp. 31, 37 [34 Cal.2d] [207 P.2d 1]. [4] Thus 
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in respect to municipal affairs the city is not subject to gen-
eral law except as the charter may provide. (Heilbron v. 
Sttmner, 186 Cal. 648, 650 [200 P. 409] ; Muehleisen v. 
Forward, 4 Cal.2d 17, 19 [46 P.2d 969].) [5] As recog-
nized in the West Coast Advertising case, the levy of taxes 
for city purposes is a municipal affair; the collection, treat-
ment and disposal of city sewage and the making of contracts 
therefor are likewise municipal affairs (Loop Lumber Co. v. 
Van Loben Sels, 173 Cal. 228, 232 [159 P. 600]), and neither 
may be held to be ci1·curnscribed except as expressly limited 
by the charter provisions. [6] All rttles of statutory con-
stnwtion as applied to charter provisions ... are subordinate 
to this controlling principle. The former guide-that mu-
nicipalities have only the powers conferred and those neces-
sarily incident thereto. . . . A construction in favor of the 
exercise of the power and against the existence of any limita-
tion or restriction thereon which is not expressly stated in 
the charter is clearly indicated. So guided, reason dictates 
that the full exercise of the power is permitted except as 
clearly and explicitly curtailed. Thus in construing the city's 
charter a restriction on the exercise of municipal power may 
not be implied." (Emphasis added; City of Grass Valley v. 
Walkinshaw, 34 Cal.2d 595, 598-599 [212 P.2d 894].) 
[7] It is not necessary, therefore, that there be specific 
authority for the charge (the nature of the charge is dis-
cussed later) here levied. By virtue of its power as a 
chartered city plaintiff has power to make it unless it is 
expressly denied such power by the charter or Constitution. 
[8] Defendants assert that there are such limitations in the 
charter. Section 12 of article XI thereof provides that when-
ever the city council determines that public interest requires 
an expenditure for a municipal purpose which cannot be 
provided out of the ordinary city revenue, it "may" submit 
to the voters a proposition providing for a "special tax" 
or the issuing of bonds. No election was held for the adoption 
of the ordinance in question. This contention is correctly 
met by City of Glendale v. Crescenta etc. Water Co., 135 
Cal.App.2d 784, 798 [288 P.2d 105], where it is pointed out 
that an excise tax may be imposed without a vote as section 
12 of article XI referred only to property taxes, the court 
stating: ''Respondent asserts a violation of section 12, arti-
cle XI of the charter, claiming this is a special tax which 
is invalid for failure to submit to the electors. That section 
must be construed in the light of related provisions. Section 
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11 says: 'The total tax rate for any one year shall not 
exceed one per cent of the assessed valuation, unless a special 
tax be authorized, as provided in this chapter; ... ' .And sec-
tion 12: 'Whenever the Council shall determine that the 
public interest demands an expenditure for municipal pur-
poses, which cannot be provided for out of the ordinary 
revenue of the City, it may submit to the qualified voters 
at a regular or special election, a proposition to provide for 
such expenditure, either by levying a special tax, or by issu-
ing bonds, but no such special tax shall be levied nor any 
such bonds issued, unless authorized by the affirmative votes 
of two-thirds of the electors voting at such election.' . . . 
Sections 9, 10 and 11 are so worded as to refer exclusively 
to ad valorem property taxes. Section 11 says in effect that 
the basic rate of one per cent of assessed valuation may be 
increased to the extent of a special tax voted by the people. 
This could mean only a property tax. Section 12 implements 
the phrase of 11, 'unless a special tax be authorized, as 
provided in this charter; . . .' It does so by submitting 
to the voters at a general or special election a proposal to 
provide for an expenditure which ordinary revenues cannot 
meet-to provide for same 'either by levying a special tax, 
or by issuing bonds'; same must be approved by two-thirds 
vote. Section 22 of the same article authorizes payment, 
at the election of the council, of all or any part of the 
Metropolitan tax out of the public service surplus fund. 
This was done by amendment in 1941, later than the passage 
or amendment of section 11 or section 12. It would be unduly 
straining the meaning of section 12 to hold that it requires 
a special election to raise funds for any part of the Metro-
politan tax which is not to be paid out of the surplus fund. 
Section 12 relates only to property taxes." 
[9] Defendants also point to section 6 of article XXIII 
of the charter.* Obviously this is nothing more than a per-
*It provides the council may adopt a procedure '' ... for the im-
provement of streets, alleys or other public places, or for the removal 
of dirt, rubbish, weeds and other rank growths and materials which may 
injure or endanger neighboring property or the health or the welfare 
of inhabitants of the vicinity, from buildings, lots and grounds and the 
sidewalks opposite thereto, and for making and enforcing assessments 
against property benefited or affccterl the1·eby or from which such 
removal is made, for the cost of such improv~monts or removal, and 
may make such assessments a lion on such property superior to all other 
claims or lie~ls thereon, except State, County and Municipal taxes, but 
no such onlmancc shnll TH'C'Yent tho Council from proceeding under 
general laws for said purposes." (Glendale Charter, Stats. 1921, p. 2204 
as amended.) 
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missive method by which rubbish may be required to be 
removed and not a limitation on other methods when we 
consider the nature of the power of chartered cities as shown 
by the .Ainsworth and \Valkinshaw cases and other cases and 
authorities cited therein. 
Defendants' chief contention is that the charge made by the 
ordinance is not a tax but merely a fee for services rendered 
and that since it is not alleged that they received the serv-
ices, the complaint fails to state a cause of action; that a 
charge for services not rendered is invalid presumably as a 
taking of property without due process of law. 
[10] It is not questioned that provisions with respect to 
rubbish are a proper exercise of the police power (see In re 
Zhizhuzza, 147 Cal. 328 [81 P. 955]; California Reduction 
Co. v. Sanitary Red1wtion Works, 199 U.S. 306 [26 S.Ct. 100, 
50 L.Ed. 204] ; In re Pedrosian, 124 Cal..App. 692 [13 P.2d 
:>89]; Glass v. City of Fresno, 17 Cal..App.2d 555 [62 P.2d 
765]; Ponti v. Burastero, 112 Cal..App.2d 846 [247 P.2d 597]; 
Davis v. City of Santa Ana, 108 Oal..App.2d 669 [239 P.2d 
656]). 'l'he power of the city to pass police regulations on 
the subject of rubbish being clear, we must look to see if 
there is any constitutional objection to the charge here im-
posed. The case is analogous to the requirement by a city 
that all premises connect with the city sewer system at the 
expense of the property owners or making a charge therefor 
even though the premises have other adequate sewer facilities. 
'!'here is no constitutional objection to such a requirement. 
(See Sanitation Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson Cotlnty v. Campbell, 
~- Ky. -- [249 S.W.2d 767] ; District of Columbia v. 
B1·ooke, 214 U.S. 138 [29 S.Ot. 560, 53 L.Ed. 941] ; Htdchin-
son v. City of Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303 [33 S.Ct. 290, 57 L.Ed. 
520] ; Farqtthar v. Board of Sttpervisors, 196 Va. 54 [82 
S.E.2d 577] ; Fenton v. Atlantic City, 90 N.J.L. 403 [103 .A. 
695].) And the same is true of a city water system to which 
premises must connect and pay the rates although they have 
other water supplies. (Weber City Sanitation Com. v. Craft, 
196 Va. 1140 [87 S.E.2d 153] .) It is said in Farquhar v. 
Board of Supervisors, 196 Va. 54 [82 S.E.2d 577, 587]: 
"Lastly it is contended that the enforcement of sewerage con-
nections, the collection of charges and the creation of a lien 
therefor ... may deprive landowners of their property with-
out due process of law. These sections provide that the 
owner, tenant or occupant of a parcel of land upon which is a 
building for residential, commercial or industrial use, which 
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parcel abuts upon a street containing a sanitary sewer which 
is part of or served by the sewer system, may be required, 
with the consent of the local government, to connect his 
building with the sewer and cease to use any other method of 
sewage disposal. If the charges for the use of the system 
are not paid within 30 days after becoming due, the Authority 
may disconnect the premises from the water and/or sewer 
system, or otherwise suspend services and recover the amount 
due in a civil action .... 
''Such provisions are necessary implements of a sanitary 
system constructed and operated by an agency of the State 
which was created and organized for the public good. . . . 
We hold the provisions in question to be constitutional as 
being a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State 
and bearing a substantial relation to the protection and pres-
ervation of the public health. 39 C.J.S., Health, § 2, p. 811, 
§ 21 at p. 835; 25 Am.Jur., Health, § 3, p. 287. Like pro-
visions have been frequently upheld against the charge of 
being an invasion of constitutional rights." [11] In the 
instant case the ordinance is in many respects a police meas-
ure. Section 8, supra, in effect provides that every occupant 
of buildings must pay the charges for rubbish collection which 
means that they must pay whether or not they use the collec-
tion service. This is, so far as the constitutional question is 
concerned, if anything, less stringent than the requirement 
that they use the service as held in the authorities, supra, 
dealing with sewer and water. In those cases it was held 
that a charge could be made for the service even though the 
occupants did not want it. In most of those cases the charge 
was said not to be a tax but rather a service charge but it is 
not important whether, on this phase of the case, it be called 
a tax or a service charge; it is justified under the police 
power. As long as there is no restriction in the Constitution 
or charter the ordinance must be held valid. It is not claimed 
that the charge is excessive or discriminatory (a denial of 
equal protection), and it appears that a benefit is received 
by the occupants of all property as all the probabilities point 
to the existence of the accumulation of rubbish described in 
the ordinance on all occupied property. The benefit is the 
availability of the collection service to all occupants-the 
regular service of collection and the right to accumulate rub-
bish, like the benefit of sewage facilities although the occupant 
does not choose to use them. As said in Carson v. Brockton 
Sewerage Com., 182 U.S. 398, 405 [21 S.Ct. 860, 45 L.Ed. 
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1151] : "N otwithstanrling the former case, we think the court 
was correct in holding in this case that the petitioner and other 
property owners whose lots abutted on this public sewer did 
receive a benefit not common to the inhabitants of the city 
generally, in being permitted to discharge into it the contents 
of their private sewers, that the amount of such benefit was 
determinable by the city council, and that in its action there 
was nothing violative of the Federal Constitution." (See 
Patterson v. City of Chattanooga, 192 Tenn. 267 [241 S.W.2rl 
291]; Sharp v. Hall, 198 Okla. 678 [181 P.2d 972].) 
County Corn'rs of Anne Anmdel Cotrnty v. English, 182 
Md. 514 [35 A.2d 135], and Rapa v. Haines, (Ohio App.) 101 
N.E.2d 733, are not in point as they involved a tax for revenue 
purposes. 
In the foregoing discussion we have assumed that the charge 
for the rubbish collection system is a charge for a service under 
the police power and valid as such but it is also valid if 
designated as a tax. .As seen, the city has powers of taxation 
except as limited by its charter and the Constitutions, state 
and federal. [12] While the ordinance has many police 
regulations as above shown, there is no obstacle to it perform-
ing both functions, taxation and regulation, and it may be 
upheld as valid under either or both powers. (See Redwood 
Theatres, Inc. v. City of Modesto, 86 Cal..App.2d 907 [196 
P.2d 119]; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 [20 S.Ct. 633, 
44 !J.Ed. 725] ; Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U.S. 477 [33 S.Ct. 
318, 57 L.Ed. 603] .) [13] Considering the charge as a tax, 
it is more like an excise tax than any other kind. It is not 
a property tax because it is not on an ad valorem basis. 
It does not purport to tax property or any interest therein, 
possessory or otherwise. The charge is made against "occu-
pants" of property graduated according to the nature of the 
buildings occupied. The charge is not against the property. 
We do not have, therefore, any question of double taxation or 
possible invalidity for a failure to assess it according to 
value (see Fox etc. Corp. v. City of Bakersfield, supra, 36 Cal. 
2d 136). It is similar to an excise tax as it is laid on the 
occupant for the accumulation and having available to him 
the regular collection of rubbish which may be referred to as 
a privilege. [14] It is said: "It is, however, difficult to 
arrive at any all-inclusive definition of the term 'excise tax,' 
since it has long since been changed from its original connota-
tion of an impost upon a privilege. In its modern sense an 
excise tax is any tax which does not fall within the classifica-
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tion of a poll tax or a property tax, and embraces every 
form of burden not laid directly upon persons or property." 
(51 Am.,Jur., Taxation, § 33.) And: "Taxes fall naturally 
into three namely, capitation or poll taxes, taxes on 
property, and excises. In general, it may be said that all 
taxes fall into one or the other of the foregoing classes, any 
exaction which is elearly not a poll tax or a property tax being 
an excise." (I d., § 24.) [15] It should be observed that a 
right may be subject to an: excise tax even if the right of 
occupancy rather than of the accumulation and use of a col-
lection service is involved, although it is a right which cannot 
be prohibited under the Constitution. It is said in Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 578 [57 S.Ct. 883, 81 
L.Ed. 1279, 109 A.L.R. 1293], involving the social security 
tax on employers: "\Ve are told that the relation of employ-
ment is one so essential to the pursuit of happiness that it may 
not be burdened with a tax. Appeal is made to history. From 
the precedents of colonial days we are supplied with illus-
trations of excises common in the colonies. They are said 
to have been bound up with the enjoyment of particular com-
modities. Appeal is also made to principle or the analysis 
of concepts. An excise, we are told, imports a tax upon a 
privilege; employment, it is said, is a right, not a privilege, 
from which it follows that employment is not subject to an 
excise. Neither the one appeal nor the other leads to the 
desired goal. 
''As to the argument from history: Doubtless there were 
many excises in colonial days and later that were associated, 
more or less intimately, with the enjoyment or the use of prop-
erty. This would not prove, even if no others were then 
known, that the forms then accepted were not subject to 
enlargement. [Citations.] But in truth other excises were 
known, and known since early times. Thus in 1695 (6 & 7 
\Vm. III, c. 6), Parliament passed an act which granted 'to 
His Majesty certain Rates and Duties upon Marriage, Births 
and Burials,' all for the purpose of 'carrying on the War 
Against France with Vigour.' (See Opinion of the Justices, 
196 Mass. 603, 609 [85 N.E. 545]. No commodity was affected 
there. The industry of counsel has supplied us with an apter 
illustration where the tax was not different in substance from 
the one now challenged as invalid. In 1777, before our Con-
stitutional Convention, Parliament laid upon employers an 
annual 'duty' of 21 shillings for 'every male Servant' em-
ployed in stated forms of work. [Citation.] The point is 
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made as a distinction that a tax upon the use of male 
servants was thought of as a tax upon a luxury. [Citation.] 
It did not touch employments in husbandry or business. This 
is to throw over the argument that historically an excise is a 
tax upon the enjoyment of commodities. But the attempted 
distinction, whatever may be thought of its validity, is in-
applicable to a statute of Virginia passed in 1780. There a 
tax of three pounds, six shillings and eight pence was to be 
paid for every male tithable above the age of twenty-one 
years (with stated exceptions), and a like tax for 'every white 
servant whatsoever, except apprentices under the age of 
twenty one years.' [Citation.] Our colonial forebears knew 
more about ways of taxing than some of their descendants 
seem to be willing to concede. 
''The historical prop failing, the prop or fancied prop of 
principle remains. 1,V e learn that employment for lawful 
gain is a 'natural' or 'inherent' or 'inalienable' right, and 
not a 'privilege' at all. But nat1tral rights, so called, are as 
mtwh s1tbject to taxation as rights of less importance. An 
excise is not limited to vocations or activities that may be 
prohibited altogether. It is not limited to those that are the 
outcome of a franchise. It extends to vocations or activities 
pursued as of common right. . . . Whether the tax is to be 
classified as an 'excise' is in truth not of critical importance. 
If not that, it is an 'impost.' ... A capitation or other 
'direct' tax it certainly is not. 'Although there have been 
from time to time intimations that there might be some tax 
which was not a direct tax nor included under the words 
''duties, imposts and excises,'' such a tax for more than one 
hundred years of national existence has as yet remained un-
discovered, notwithstanding the stress of particular circum-
stances has invited thorough investigation into sources of 
powers.' Pollock v. Farmers' Loan&; Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 
557 [15 S.Ct. 673, 39 L.Ed. 759]. There is no departure 
from that thought in later cases, but rather a new emphasis 
on it. Thus, in Thornas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 370 
[24 S.Ct. 305, 48 L.Ed. 481], it was said of the words 'duties, 
impost and excises' that 'they were used comprehensively 
to cover customs and excise duties imposed on importation, 
consumption, mannfacture and sale of certain commodities, 
privileges, particular business transactions, vocations, occn-
pations and the like.' '' (Emphasis added.) Such charges 
as here involved have been called taxes: ". . . a large part 
of the cost of the sewer system of the City of Philadelphia 
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was raised by assessments against abutting property owners. 
Being imposed without any regard whatever to the extent or 
value of the use made of the sewer facilities, or whether any 
usc is made, the charge provided for by the ordinance is, in 
legal effect, undoubtedly a tax, and the obligation to pay it 
could be created only by the City's exercise of its general 
taxing power." (In re Petition of City of Philadelphia, 
340 Pa. 17 [ 16 A.2d 32, 35].) And a charge somewhat 
analogous to that here involved has been upheld as a valid 
excise tax (Bapa v. Haines, (Ohio App.) 101 N.E.2d 733; 
affd. 113 N.E.2d 121, involving a fixed tax on auto trailers 
used for human habitation). A contrary result was reached 
in Cmrnty Com'rs of Anne Arundel County v. English, supra, 
182 Md. 514 [35 A.2d 135], but it was based on a denial of 
equal protection of the law where a fiat tax was placed on 
auto trailers with the wheels off but none on other habitations 
and that it was a property tax not based on value. Those 
things are not present here. The tax is on the factors men-
tioned and is not discriminatory. On the contrary, reasonable 
dassifications are made. 
[16] Since the charge may be called an excise tax on the 
occupants of real property for the privilege of accumulating 
rubbish and having available collection service therefor and is 
thus not a tax on their interest in the property as an occupant 
or possessor thereof, and there is no unjust classification, we 
find no constitutional or charter provision which invalidates 
such a tax. 
The judgments are reversed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and 
1\feComb, J., concurred. 
SHENK, J.-I concur in the opinion and the judgments of 
reversal. 'rhe opinion contains a ·well considered discussion 
of the subject of municipal affairs as applied to a munici-
pality operating under a freeholder's charter. If the same 
consideration had been given to that subject and been applied 
in the case of Wilson v. Beville, 47 Cal.2cl 852 [806 P.2cl 789], 
the judgment in that case would have been affirmed in its 
entirety. 
